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Commentary
Triptych: Three Meditations on How Law Rules
After Globalization
David A. Westbrook*
At some point now past, it became clear that the context in
which we do politics - and so our situation before our law - had
already changed. No longer did we need to talk about the historical processes that we still refer to as globalization as if such
processes were news. Without our noting precisely when, globalization has ceased to be a possibility, a development, or even a
choice and has become an assumption. We have come to understand that the politics that structure our world are defined beyond the confines of the nation state and therefore, to suspect
that our inherited intellectual apparatus, based upon the assumption that national institutions were the foundation of political life, is ill-fitted to our new situation. In particular, we do
not understand whether or not we should be happy to obey.
Those of us who are lawyers may take some comfort in the
fact that legalism ranges the new world. We see the war on terrorism, the construction of markets, and even our identities articulated in terms that are already legal, or terms so formal that
the law may use them as need be. But while global politics are
often articulated legalistically, the nagging suspicion arises that
such expressions are not law, not really. It seems odd to speak
of the Rule of Globalization in the same worshipful tones that
* Associate Professor, State University of New York at Buffalo School of Law.
This piece situates and extends thinking done for a book, City of Gold: An Apology
for Globalizationin a Time of Discontent. My deep thanks to Pierre d'Argent, Jim
Chen, Sherman Clark, Michael Glennon, Marc Miller, Pierre Schlag, Jack Schlegel,
Amy, Joseph and Viola Westbrook, and Frank Vogel. Charles Miller's research help
and Barb Kennedy's clerical assistance are much appreciated. More specific acknowledgments are provided where appropriate in the text. I take full responsibility
for whatever mistakes and foolishness mar this effort.

338

MINN.

J. GLOBAL TRADE

[Vol. 12:2

we traditionally use when discussing the Rule of Law. The formalities that comprise our globalization seem only superficially
structured, strangely floating. Reverence does not seem to be
the correct attitude to take to such formalities, even if they do in
fact constrain us. But if reverence for our law is difficult to
muster, then what is the correct attitude for those of us who are
lawyers -mandarins who run bureaucracies - to take toward the
law? What does it mean to be tending a vast conceptual structure whose authority is so distant as to be rumored?
I.

METHOD: LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP WITHOUT THE RULE
OF LAW?

How can such questions be pursued?
I am hardly the first to argue that the ideal of the Rule of
Law has run its course, and can no longer serve to organize our
thinking about politics or our scholarship. A certain impatience
with the Rule of Law is implicit in any critique of modernity and
certainly has marked "critical" legal thought in the United
States since at least the late 1970s.' This impatience notwithstanding, critical legal scholarship often seems lost in a great
forest, discovering its own tracks, and understanding that it has
stopped moving forward. Much of this disorientation is structured as follows: critical scholars analyze (and debunk) claims to
legal authority by providing alternate accounts of the social
phenomena in question, accounts that only superficially have to
do with law. In the critical mode, legal scholarship turns on the
ability to uncover some anterior, more authentic, content that
masquerades as "law." Law then is "really" the desire for political power, or a racial or sexual hierarchy, or the drive to acquire
wealth ("economic efficiency"), or a moral authenticity, or in Pierre Schlag's most recent outing, a psychologically sensible arrangement of things (an "aesthetic").2 But if we believe law is
hollow, a vessel, then we may wish to talk about its content,
about the "politics" or "power" or whatever it is that law is
1. The literature is large, but ritual citations include: MORTON J. HORWrTZ,
THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1780-1860 (Harvard University Press
1977); ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, KNOWLEDGE & POLITICS (The Free Press
1975); Duncan Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries, 28 BUFF. L.
REV. 205 (1979). For a bit of perspective, see John Henry Schlegel, Notes Toward an
Intimate, Opinionated, and Affectionate History of the Conference on CriticalLegal
Studies, 36 STAN. L. REV. 391 (1984).
2. See generally Pierre Schlag, The Aesthetics of American Law, 115 HARV. L.
REV. 1047 (2002).
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"really" about.
Turning their attention to the substratum is difficult for legal scholars, in part because as they stray from the bounds of
their discipline, the authority that the discipline can provide
them decreases. Scholars outside their disciplines are in the
wilderness, relying on their own intellectual and persuasive resources, which is a scary proposition. If we critically-minded legal thinkers nonetheless turn our attention to the anterior and
authentic content that we deployed in order to suggest law's hollow nature, we usually discover that what we had claimed was
the real content of the law, for convenience "politics," had been
rather unspecified. When we begin to specify this content, a curious transformation takes place. Like the child in the fairytale,
critical scholars cry that the law is less than it appears, that the
emperor has no clothes. But while it is importantly true (and
fun, terrifying, and so forth) that the emperor is naked (that we
are all naked), awareness of these truths resolves none of the
questions of standing and protocol that we used to answer by
reference to clothing. How, after all, are naked people to live
among one another? In answering that question, legal scholars,
however critical, tend to deploy the intellectual tools of their
training (drawing distinctions, constructing models or tests,
making analogies, etc.), the same tools that, during the moment
of critique, had just been unmasked as obfuscation and persiflage. Instead of resolving anything, critical analysis of claims
to legal authority tends to displace such claims more or less
logically intact onto another field of disputation. At least in the
hands of law professors, discontent with the Rule of Law seems
to lead to a new elaboration of the Rule of Law. Serious discontent with the Rule of Law is something lawyers have great difficulty expressing.
Part of this difficulty is social: Most of our legal scholarship
is constrained by the author's understandable unwillingness to
lose the privileges conferred upon us by our discipline. Or, more
kindly, we lawyers have difficulty thinking in terms other than
legal simply because we are lawyers, victims of our graduate
education. But part of the difficulty here is intellectual, substantive: In our ceaseless denial and then reaffirmation of the
culture in which we have been trained, our formerly vaunted
critical faculties seem to have less potential than they once did.
While I have not conducted a poll, I think it is fair to say that
U.S. legal scholars generally believe that valid critiques of
whatever argument they may make are available, even cheap.
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This begets the proposition that the analytic and critical capabilities of U.S. legal scholarship have outstripped the abilities of
the discipline to rationalize. Under such circumstances, it is
unclear what principled purpose argument could have, and
hence
it is unclear what legal scholars, as legal scholars, should
3
do.

The practical and institutional response to this situation is
balkanization and repetition. While critique may make argument impossible as a whole, vehement yet principled argument
is still quite possible within the confines of subdisciplines ranging from economics to radical feminism. Participation in such
subdisciplines requires adoption of shared assumptions, discursive primitives that are beyond criticism, that make argument
possible. But argument is only really possible within the subdiscipline. For example, economists argue among people who
already agree that "the problem" needs to be analyzed in terms
of rational individuals; feminists argue among people who already know that gendered hierarchy needs attention, now. Discourse within such disciplines where the rules are already
known tends to be repetitive and hence somewhat tiresome.
Outside the subdiscipline, however, there is only chaotic discussion of first principles, bad metaphysics, which is more quickly
tiresome. In its preaching to the choir, balkanization's successes are modest, although perhaps sufficient for the purposes
of institutional stability (participants in various subdisciplines
need not talk to one another much). On the other hand, balkanization is not only unsatisfying for a host of reasons too obvious and painful to recount, it is an unsatisfying way to begin
thinking about large-scale politics, about globalization.
Among U.S. legal scholars, nobody has more directly confronted this widespread sense that the legal academy is losing
its faith in its own arguments than Pierre Schlag. In his recent
The Aesthetics of American Law, Schlag depicts arguments as
modes of expression, modes with typical sequences of moves,
manipulable in characteristic ways, producing relatively predictable outcomes.4 Argument, in short, is a matter of style, although perhaps we should understand "style" with the serious
connotations of art, e.g. classicism, baroque, etc., rather than
with the more frivolous connotations of fashion, e.g. acid wash,
boot cut, bell bottom, etc. Law does matter, after all. But un3. At this level, critical legal studies, or postmodernism generally, may have
been more successful than anyone dreamed possible.
4. See generally Schlag, supra note 2.
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derstanding legal scholarship in terms of aesthetics, style, is
problematic for legal scholars because "once a dispute becomes
explicitly aesthetic, rational argument has reached a kind of
terminus."' And indeed it has.

How troubled should we be to find that even in the hands of
law professors reason has limits, what Schlag calls a "terminus"? Perhaps we should be very troubled, even downright disturbed. The legal community frequently conflates law and reason, and Schlag himself sometimes seems to conflate reason and
speech. For example, "[olnce a dispute becomes explicitly a contest of aesthetics, there is not a whole lot more to say other
than, 'Well, that's just the way I see things."'6 Schlag thus suggests certain decadence, and so it is perhaps unsurprising that
he draws ire from his colleagues.7 Consider this recent statement: "[flinally[!], for those who experience law in terms of all
the aesthetics, a great number of jurisprudential problems become at once clear, rationally insoluble, and no longer terribly
interesting."8 The terminus of reason seems to signal the abandonment of thought as useless, and with it, law as uninteresting. Presumably force will abide, and so Schlag's move to aesthetics might be seen as a loss of nerve, a dinner party in the
spring of 1914, a refined prelude to violent chaos.
Well, no. While such dramatization is fun, it is also rather
self-indulgent, even juvenile [sorry]. For rationalist law professors (often including Schlag), it is easy consciously or subconsciously to bifurcate the world into reason on the one hand and
chaos or silence (both associated with death) on the other hand.
Rationalists unsurprisingly give reason far too much credit and
so conversely tend to assume that reason's absence is terribly
significant, probably horrible. Our lives, however, are lived in
the insufficiency of reason. To say that "rational argument has
reached a kind of terminus" is,if anything, too flattering to rational argument, because the statement implies that the train
was running fine, but has simply reached the end of the line.
Schlag suggests that reason's progress has been arrested, broken, interrupted, that the world used to move on reason's tracks

5. Id. at 1105.
6. Id.
7. A string citation to the vociferous critics would serve little purpose. I continue to be amazed at the hostility with which Schlag's not unimportant and very
clever ventures are received, as if our republic were threatened by godless witticisms.
8. Schlag, supra note 2, at 1102.
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and now it does not. But there has not been a train wreck; we
were never on a train.
Even much of intellectual life is led in circumstances in
which we are acutely conscious of the limitations of rational argument. Consider the practice of criticism, paradigmatically art
history or for that matter, any history. Facts cannot be perceived, much less deemed significant, without an intellectual
frame in which to do so. But the construction of that frame, e.g.
a perspective on a group of artists, or a theory, however inchoate, of historical change, is a painful, difficult, self-consciously
problematic project. Consider also the practice of art. Schlag, a
gifted writer, forgets himself in the statement: "This is why in
law - as contrasted, say, with poetry or painting - rightness

cannot be put so easily aside."9 No poet thinks that rightness
can be put aside, that any old word will do. To say that reason
ends does not mean there is not much more to say, or to think,
or even to argue. Even in law, our recognition of the limitations
of our reason - and the awareness of the unfounded nature of
our judgments - does not mean, "the less interesting and less
pressing rightness questions become. " 1°

Our awareness of

judgment, aesthetic qualities, at the root of our reasons means
that the epistemological status of our thoughts and arguments
are uncertain. We know that our own minds are strange to us.
Such awareness, however, does not mean that thought is impossible for us or that we somehow have been excused.
If Schlag is right (and he is) that "law is itself an aesthetic
enactment," then legal argument presumes the ability to reach
agreement on the frame in which argument takes place; legal
argument presumes a necessarily temporary resolution of the
contest of aesthetics.1 Indeed, a similar terminus was reached
by no less a rationalist than Kant in the Critique of Judgment,
in which Kant argued in part that neither conceptual nor normative reason could be conducted except upon the basis of another faculty of mind, judgment. 2 Although we experience
judgment most purely in that limited context we call aesthetic
appreciation, the faculty of judgment is by no means limited to
aesthetics. Instead, judgment (naming) is a precondition to
thinking at all. While recognition of the aesthetic aspect at the
9.
10.
11.
12.
1951).

Id. at 1108.
Id.
Id. at 1118.
See generally IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF JUDGMENT (Hafner Pub. Co.
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foundations of our thinking may be regarded as, in some sense,
a terminus of reason, it should also be regarded as the beginning of thought.
To recapitulate: It is easy enough to overstate the importance of our loss of faith in our arguments, and therefore to
overstate the significance of the confusion felt in many quarters
of the U.S. legal academy. Academic problems are mostly problems for academics, rather than insurmountable difficulties to
thought. Socially, our loss of faith in our discipline means only
that our positions (education, background, moral rectitude, and
so forth) do not suffice to make us worth listening to, or reading.
Substantively, our loss of faith in arguments means only that
we recognize how feeble a tool our reason is for making life sensible. 13 Politics and law have not ceased to be interesting objects of thought; much remains to be written. But we should be
more humble. Law teachers cannot truthfully claim much authority for something we regularly train bright students to become facile at doing, namely making arguments. Our thinking
and writing are just that, thinking and writing, rather than
"law" or even its more polite form, "policy."
But what is legal scholarship that does not claim to be law?
How do we write if we abandon our professional tendency to understand our own thinking as rationally and hence politically
authoritative? A preliminary answer is negative: such writing
would have to come to grips with the fact that we are at best
persuasive and not binding, to use traditional language. Our
works must be worth reading and our arguments must be worth
following on their own account. 4 And that standard is not easy
to meet, as a few rhetorical questions should make painfully
clear. How many law review articles do you recommend to your
intellectual friends who are not professors of law? To professors
13. This is overstated slightly. Experience matters. But the great and the good
rarely understand their authority to derive from the fact that they have witnessed
and done; the human tendency is to believe one is great and good because so frequently right.
14. Due to the importance of law and the university in contemporary public
life, simply because we are professors we may be worth listening to as a political
matter, but not so worthwhile as street graffiti, campaign speeches, corporate enthusiasm, military euphemism .... law professors are no doubt political actors, but
that fact is hardly sufficient to justify the thoughtful attention of busy people. For
the professor who understands her work to be justified by its practical political effects, the existential situation is even more desperate, for reasons Pierre Schlag
makes uncomfortably clear. See generally the reactions to Schlag's work in Symposium: Beyond Right and Reason: Pierre Schlag's The Enchantment of Reason, 57 U.
MIAMI L. REV. (forthcoming 2003).
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of law in other subdisciplines? Not much legal scholarship can
stand up to such questions, not even among people who spend
much of their days thinking about law, because the vast majority of legal scholarship relies on the authority of the discipline,
and secondarily, the coercive force of argument. Abandoning
the claim to reasoned authority means abandoning the claim to
be read by our peers, the claim that if one is to canvas the literature, we are owed a footnote. We must confront the possibility
that our writing is not worth reading, our arguments not worth
following much less rebutting, and in fact will not be read or
considered.., before we begin to write.
But that is merely a negative answer, a reminder of how we
should not write. Can anything be said about how to write? If
we assume both that professors will continue to write, and (improbably) that such writing will not continue to be purely formulaic, like the eight-legged essay with which the Chinese civil
service used to test prospective bureaucrats, then what? For
that genre of expression known as legal scholarship, what are
the formal consequences of abandoning argument?
One place to start is by reconsidering the character of the
rebellion and reconciliation that characterizes so much legal
scholarship, and indeed so many professorial lives. As discussed
above, contemporary frustration with legal rules, even the Rule
of Law itself, often leads to critique, which oddly enough often
results in the recapitulation of the legal tropes originally held to
be offensive, although the recapitulation sometimes takes place
in another intellectual field. In legal scholarship, as elsewhere,
rebellion is repetitive, often painfully so. Repetition should not,
however, obscure the fact that the law professor's law against
which scholars rebel, and which they then recapitulate, is strikingly different from real law. The rules of law generated by contemporary scholars are quite literally fantastic: scholars propose
rules that are fantasies of authority. Such fantasies are not restricted to scholars who write in a more or less utopian vein.
Modest efforts at constitutional re(interpretation), or less modest efforts to assert property rights, or secure efficiency gains,
are all efforts to impose the mind's order on a recalcitrant world,
yet which claim the authority of law. Such claims, of course, are
specious. As we are not kings, such "law" tends to be irrelevant.
At best, such efforts are special pleading (the Constitution, our
higher ideals, human rights, or simply the law requires the
world I wish to see) and as special pleading, unbelievable. It is
this wishful quality that leads to the formal conundrum that
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confronts so many contemporary legal scholars, and that perhaps suggests a solution.
To state the conundrum: On the one hand, once we agree
with Kafka that the law is something that we never yet know, it
seems at best dishonest to write as if we were chancellors, empowered to set forth the king's writ. Once we lose the faith that
even our own, no doubt very clever, legal argument should be
understood as legally authoritative, binding, it becomes difficult
to write legislatively to propose the one right rule. 15 On the
other hand, considered as fiction, a sort of fairytale in which
reason meets politics, politics sees the error of its ways, and we
live happily ever after, the law review article is a terrible form:
boring, inelegant, petty, implausible, ugly ....

Once we under-

stand that our thinking does not issue in something that can be
justified as a statement ("review") of the law, but is instead an
awkward fantasy that politics can be made to conform to our
minds, orthodox legal scholarship becomes an almost unredeemed exercise of professional discipline.
Fortunately, the profession's emphasis on years of competitive achievement ensures that only very disciplined people become teachers. Many legal scholars are disciplined enough to
work in an artistic form in which they do not believe. To be
blunt, many legal scholars are quite capable of writing pulp fiction. Other scholars tell themselves (in an oligarchy, perhaps
truthfully) that their voices are powerful. They believe that
they are what international law calls "publicists," and their expressions are in fact a source of law. For whatever reason, however, the law review article remains the usual form of legal
scholarship. This is unfortunate, because in their allegiance to
the law review article, by failing to break form, professors restrict not just how they write but substantively limit what they
can say. 6 For pertinent example, the law review article cannot
15. This is a reduction of my understanding of Pierre Schlag's critique of U.S.
legal thought. I have engaged Schlag's work more extensively - and discussed the
possibilities of the essay - in David A. Westbrook, Pierre Schlag and the Temple of
Boredom, 57 U. MIAMI L. REV. (forthcoming 2003). And it is worth considering the
extent to which Schlag stays within, barely, but within, the traditional form of the
law review article. Many law professors write books, a form less susceptible to the
problems discussed here.
16. Two important, but generally partial, exceptions to this generalization
spring to mind. First, many scholars working in critical race theory, feminist theory, and other "outsider" perspectives often use narrative techniques - tell stories to suggest the experiences that inform the perspectives of their arguments. Second,
a great deal of critical theory done by folks who could not plausibly claim to be born
outside (insider critical theory? straight white male critical theory?) focuses on the
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articulate something as nuanced as a sensibility toward global
modernity, as important as that is to contemporary legal consciousness.
Therefore, in order to ask what the Rule of Law can mean
for our historical situation, I have not turned to the law review
article, which would be an intellectually grotesque (if funny) exercise, but instead have used a rather literary form, the personal essay. As a form, the essay foregrounds the tentative and
occasional character of thought, the story of a thought's development. In place of the article's logical necessity and hence political coercion, the essay, like the novel, turns on happenstance
and fortuity. Where the article attempts to establish what must
be thought, the essay tells how its author has come to think.
Where the article denies the effort of always fallible minds, denies its fiction and grasping but simply claims to be true, the essay revels in the effort of mind, treats thought and even writing,
with their inevitable failures, as a kind of heroism. Bluntly,
Triptych is an effort to do law and literature, as opposed to deploying the scholarly apparatus of literary studies to make an
academic argument about a legal topic.
Each essay in Triptych confronts an area of social life that
currently seems problematic, and asks what our subterranean
commitments, what the law we understand to be ours, really is.
In its dealing with a specific aspect of globalization, each of
these three essays articulates an attitude that might be appropriate for a custodian of our formalities (for a lawyer in a selfconsciously global society) to take towards the law that now
rules. 17 Does This Really Change Everything? maintains that
law divides civilized from barbarian and legitimates our force-

oppressive experiences of legal education and the implausible writing of scholars,
that is, on law in the academy as opposed to elsewhere in the world. But such variations reaffirm rather than disturb the genre. The professor, radical critique done,
returns to the plow and resumes teaching, all the while understanding his or her
thought to have been justified insofar as it challenged the status quo, at least for a
little while.
17. Jim Chen has also confronted globalization in tripartite fashion, in a typically tough-minded (too tough minded for many of his colleagues) and erudite (ditto)
series of articles that defend globalization from the most commonly heard political
criticisms. See Jim Chen, Epiphytic Economics and the Politics of Place, 10 MINN. J.
GLOBAL TRADE 1 (2001); Jim Chen, Pax Mercatoria: Globalization as a Second
Chance at 'Peace for Our Time,' 24 FoRDHAM INT'L L.J. 217 (2000); Jim Chen, Globalization and Its Losers, 9 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 157 (2000). There is much to say
at this juncture, but for present purposes it suffices to note that Chen's arguments
are political, and therefore addressed to an adversary, an interlocutor. The essays
that comprise Triptych, in contrast, are far more interior.
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fulness against the barbarians. Island on the Horizon of Desire
presents the private law of markets as the matrix through
which desires are gratified and more obscurely, public law as a
mechanism through which desires are deferred and thereby
kept alive. Finally, Kafka's Laughter suggests that law - in the
sense of formality - facilitates not only the sense of alienation
that we recognize in globalization, but also the combinations,
and hence the fecundity, that we must also acknowledge. In exploring these roles played by law in global modernity, each essay intimates an attitude that lawyers might adopt: a stoic recognition of necessity; a tragically inclined understanding of law
as the frustration of desire; and a comic understanding of law
and economics as the terrain of erotic life - the new corn that we
may still hope will sprout even from these very old fields. 8
Taken together, the essays that comprise Triptych maintain my
hope that in spite of our alienation, we may confront our law our globalized situation - with a certain ironic affection. It is
the collective purpose of these essays to begin articulating that
stance.
II. DOES THIS REALLY CHANGE EVERYTHING?
THINKING ABOUT GLOBALIZATION AFTER SEPTEMBER
11TH' 9
"This changes everything," we all said, as soon as we realized that the World Trade Center towers, almost as big as
mountains, had nonetheless fallen, that the Pentagon, nerve
center of the world's most powerful military, had actually been
attacked, and that there were still other attackers, dead in a
field in Pennsylvania and lurking who knew where else?" Nor
can one dispute that September 1 th changed everything for
18. See EDWARD COKE, REPORTS OF SIR EDWARD COKE (preface to the reader)
(London, John Streater 1672) ("out of the old Fields must spring and grow the new

Corn").
19. Much of the substance of this essay was presented as a talk at the Michigan
Law School Legal Theory Workshop on October 15, 2001. Thanks are due to
Sherman Clark for both the invitation and his enthusiasm for my efforts. Thanks
are also due to Michael Glennon, an international lawyer in the U.S. pragmatic tradition, Pierre d'Argent, an international lawyer in the classical European tradition,
and Joseph A. Westbrook, an old soldier and political philosopher - I have needed
their responses.
20. The Economist,journal of our class, ran a cover story entitled just that: The
Day the World Changed. THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 15-21, 2001, at 13. Time has moderated the newspaper's views somewhat. See How the World Has (and Hasn't)
Changed, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 27-Nov. 2, 2001, at 11.
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those who died and those who cared about them, for the New
York skyline, and perhaps for some sense of what it means to be
safe in the United States, although that sense of safety from
politics had been fraying in recent years. This was not the first
encounter with terrorism on U.S. soil. The World Trade Center
had been attacked before, in 1993, and in 1995, Timothy
McVeigh killed what we then thought was an impossible number of Americans in Oklahoma City. But even so, the scale, coordination, and success of the attacks on September 11th
dwarfed anything we had thought possible. "It is like a movie,"
people said over and over again, to indicate how impressed they
were that something almost completely unimagined, unthought,
could be made so real. Perhaps we did not understand, or perhaps the world that we had understood had been destroyed and so "this changes everything."
These horrors - especially the falling of the towers - bulked
so enormous in our imaginations that it seemed obvious to almost everyone that this was a break point in our history, that
there was a "before" and an "after" September 11th. People immediately drew parallels to Pearl Harbor, and World War II
truly did change everything - the world looked and functioned
very differently after that war. Understanding the events of
September 11th in terms of Pearl Harbor was to raise the question of whether world history somehow had changed direction
again. In this view, the years 1989-2001 were like the Jazz Age,
an almost willful denial, not incidentally facilitated by a bull
market for equity securities, of the basic ugliness of political life.
In those giddy days now past, we talked about One World, the
end of history, no bombing among countries with McDonald's,
Perpetual Peace, and much other nonsense. 21 We talked, in
short, about globalization. We worried about the inequality between rich and poor. We considered the nation state obsolete.
In this view, September 11, 2001, like October 29, 1929, pierced
our bubble, brought us to earth. Politics, we were violently reminded, is in the end a Hobbesian enterprise of grim conflict
among enemies. Politics matter. And, the nation matters because it is the form through which political life, and especially
the collective traffic in death, warfare, is organized. In this
view, among the victims of September 11th lie the grand histori21. THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE LEXUS AND THE OLIVE TREE (1999) (arguing no
country with a McDonald's has bombed another country with a McDonald's);
IMMANUEL KANT, PERPETUAL PEACE 155 (M. Campbell Smith trans., George Allen &
Unwin Ltd. 1st ed. 1903) (1795).
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cal narratives we call globalization, destroyed by the premodern, presumably authentic force embodied by bin Laden and
al Qaeda. If this view were right, then September 11th really
did change everything, including our new vision of human history - globalization.
But is this view right? Perhaps this latest conflict is better
understood as an expression of globalization, rather than its repudiation. Certainly the governments of the civilized world responded in ways that we have come to expect since 1989, and
whose roots go back in important ways to the settlement of
World War II, but no further. More interestingly perhaps, however, even bin Laden should be understood in part as an expression of global society, not just as violence reacting to modernity.
While perhaps also symbolic of the primitive and archaic past,
unutterably different and foreign, terrorists attack from within,
turning our society - its schools, its mails, its transportation against us. Like a cancer, bin Laden depended on the world he
tried to destroy. Our civilization responded to al Qaeda in the
only ways it knew how: with military force, political conversion,
and economic integration, that is, by forcibly reasserting its understanding of civilization in the face of barbarism.2 2 September
11th did not change our vision of human history, but left us in
the grips of those processes we regard as globalization. Indeed,
if we stop to consider dual aspects of how the war on terrorism
has been waged, we can see the present conflict as globalization
militant.
Immediately after September 11th, U.S. President George
W. Bush and British Prime Minister Tony Blair, and indeed
most of the leaders of the world's powerful nations, characterized the attacks of September 11th as attacks on civilization. 23
Other characterizations were possible, but were explicitly denied. 24 The war on terrorism was thus announced in postnational terms. The civilized world did not define this conflict
as that of one nation against another, i.e. the United States vs.
Afghanistan; or of one civilization against another, i.e. the West
vs. Islam; or even of individuals against one another, i.e. bin
22. For an exploration of how this distinction structures contemporary thought
about the international order, see generally David A. Westbrook, Law Through War,
48 BUFFALO L. REV. 299 (2000).
23. See Derek McGinty, Pres. Bush, Tony Blair and Donald Rumsfeld Give
Reasons for Striking at Afghanistan, ABC NEWS: WORLD NEWS Now, Oct. 8, 2001,
available at 2001 WL 22699990; Robert Siegal, Profile: PresidentialPress Conference, NPR: ALL THINGS CONSIDERED, Oct. 11, 2001, availableat 2001 WL 9436794.
24. McGinty, supra note 23; Siegal, supra note 23.
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Laden and al Qaeda vs. their victims. 25 Instead, world leaders
defined the conflict in terms of civilization vs. terrorism, or barbarism.
This is not to gainsay the fact that there was a lot of flag
waving, and we continue to hope that God blesses America.
Such displays of patriotism were to be expected for the simple
reason that Americans were the targets on September 11th, and
so we needed cheerful flags and divine blessings. But even
these displays of patriotism were not expressions of a nationalistic understanding of the conflict. The "war on terrorism," or
"America's new war," was not defined in national terms. As a
matter of government policy and what appears to have been the
vast weight of popular opinion, we defined the war as a conflict
against an activity - terrorism - rather than against a people or

a nation. We said that those individuals who engage in that activity are barbaric. We thus understood this war to be between
one state of being, civilized, and another state of being, barbaric.
In our understanding of the war on terrorism as a conflict between ways of being, the war functions as an engine of history like globalization.
How do civilized governments fight barbarism? First, as an
institutional matter they form a coalition. Wars fought on behalf of civilization must be waged multilaterally, lest they be
understood as old-fashioned expressions of the particular interests of national governments.26 In the sort of war that has become paradigmatic since the end of the Cold War, violence is not
legitimated as a territorial expression of the particular interests
of a government. In the war against terrorism (Afghanistan), as
in the wars against genocide (Bosnia, Rwanda, Kosovo, East
Timor) and the war against starvation caused by chaos (Somalia), military intervention was distinguished from conquest. As
an institutional matter, however, war remains organized by the
nation state. The Yugoslavian debacle rather convincingly demonstrated that the United States government remains the political institution best able to conduct military operations over long
distances. There is thus a conflict between ends - defined supranationally, and means - defined nationally. Modern supra25. Understanding September 11' in terms of individuals would have rendered
the attacks mere crimes, a characterization that would have made it difficult to understand the conflict as a war.
26. CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ, ON WAR 87 (Michael Howard & Peter Paret trans.,
Princeton Univ. Press 1976) (1832) ("[Wlar is... a continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means.").
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national wars, fought on behalf of civilization, are forever at risk
of being perceived as old fashioned wars of national interest. It
is therefore essential that other countries and supranational organizations, especially the United Nations, support the efforts
that are, as a practical matter, made by the military personnel
of some national governments, most often the United States.27
The bifurcation between civilized and barbarian that organizes modern warfare leads the civilized world to emphasize
highly targeted military intervention. The civilized world plays
to its strengths or at least to its perception of its strengths. In
particular, while the U.S. predilection for bombing may be debatable on military grounds, it is difficult to argue with the
proposition that nothing so symbolizes our military aspirations
as air superiority. 2 But we cosmopolites are a bit uneasy with
such aspirations. Surely, an advanced civilization that almost
effortlessly achieves air superiority, carries with it moral obligations, and conversely, we have defined barbarism as those who
express their political preferences violently. The idea of civilized violence thus presents substantial contradiction. Technology, smart bombs and the like, are one way to manage such tension, allowing us to express ourselves violently without giving
up our claim to historical superiority. As a result, the U.S. military worries about relatively minuscule losses of life. Stressing
the difficulty of their missions and overall professionalism, the
Air Force apologized for the killing of civilians in Afghanistan. 2 9
What, exactly, did anybody think was going to happen once bin
Laden began the war?
In defining the war as a conflict between civilization and
barbarism, we effectively abandoned the old distinction between
friend and enemy in favor of a distinction between regimes who
obstruct the interests of civilization and everybody else. So Afghans were not the enemy. ° Muslims were not the enemy.
27. The current debate over whether to use military force to overthrow the government of Iraq's Saddam Hussein may be understood in terms of this asymmetry,
i.e., the unwillingness of a number of other leading countries to legitimize decisions
made by the United States.
28. There are, of course, other reasons to emphasize bombing. For obvious example, bombing is quite safe for the military personnel actually involved, relative to
other forms of combat, and we should expect a degree of prudence from our military
leaders.
29. "The United States has repeatedly said it is not targeting civilians and regrets any loss of life." US Admits Second Bombing Error, BBC, Oct. 27, 2001, at
http://news.bbc.co.uk.
30. See, e.g., President George W. Bush, Address to a Joint Session of Congress
and the American People, Freedom at War with Fear (Sept. 20, 2001), available at
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There was no enemy, just people whose regimes were not yet
civilized. This was quite a change. The traditional view had
been that being a citizen of a bad government was risky; nobody
considered a citizen in Hitler's Germany to be safe. Now, however, if a few civilians are killed during an attack the United
States Air Force can be expected to apologize. Once we understand national governments ("the regime") to be an administrative unit of the world order, rather than the political and moral
representative of a people, then the regime's culpability says
nothing about the culpability of the people. We are free to destroy the regime while helping the people. As United Nations
Secretary General Kofi Annan put it, while bombs were falling,
"[t]he people of Afghanistan, who cannot be held responsible for
the acts of the Taliban regime, are now in desperate need of
aid."3 1 The Air Force dropped aid packages on the people even
as it dropped bombs on the regime. Governments and the people they represent are understood to be entirely distinct. Intentional violence is permissible only against the former.
The globalization of our politics has transformed the way
we end wars. Indeed, globalization in its modern form began
with the peace following World War II.32 Contrast the vindictive

peace of Versailles with the generosity of the Marshall Plan:
The difference reflects the Allies' realization that it is not
enough to win the war, the peace also must be won.33 And so in
Afghanistan, as expected, we have seen enormous amounts of
humanitarian aid. Indeed, the humanitarian aid started not
with the end of the conflict but with its beginning. And, when
the Taliban were overthrown, we saw the initiation of massive
programs aimed at integrating the Afghan economy into the
West. As with the Germans, as with all defeated nations, in Afghanistan it is important to make starting the next war bad
business. Afghanistan is the latest example of what has become
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001V09/20010920-8.html.
31. Press Release, Secretary-General of the United Nations Kofi Annan, to the
Organization of Islamic Conference Extraordinary Foreign Minister Conference in
Doha, Organization of Islamic Conference Has Central Role in Devising Effective
Strategy to Combat Terrorism, Secretary-General Says (Oct. 10, 2001), available at
www.un.orgNews/Press/docs/2001/sgsm7989.doc.htm.
32. As used in this piece, "globalization" refers to a set of political and cultural
processes quite different from the "globalization" of trade and colonialism that ended
with the World War I.
33. "Victory in this war is the first and greatest goal before us. Victory in the
peace is the next." FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES
OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 32 (Samuel I. Rosenman, ed., Harper & Brothers 1950)
(1943).
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the typical response of the civilized world to the barbarian
world: pacify and integrate.
Osama bin Laden acts like he is opposed to all that is Western and presumably opposed to globalization. Bin Laden said
that the events of September 11th divided the world into two,
3 4 One might also say that of the dar
that of belief and disbelief.
al Islam, the domain of peace, and the dar al Harb, the domain
of war.35 And it is true that, as suggested above, we defined bin
Laden and other terrorists as barbarians, and so in some sense
beyond the pale of our civilization. Those things said, on closer
scrutiny a different picture of the terrorists emerges.
1. Consider the weapons: The attacks of September 11th
were carried out with Boeing 757 and 767 aircraft.
These are not just products of globalization but current
fly by wire (computer controlled) passenger planes. Perhaps the Internet is a better symbol of globalization, but
the modern jetliner, paid for largely by business travel,
must come close.36
2. Al Qaeda was a technically sophisticated operation that
communicated electronically.
3. Bin Laden skillfully used mass media, especially videos.
4. Al Qaeda was financed by money made in the Saudi construction boom. This money flowed, of course, from the
Saudi participation in the world oil market. Al Qaeda
subsequently branched out into other international markets, such as the international drug market 8
34. "These incidents divided the entire world into two regions - one of faith
where there is no hypocrisy and another of infidelity - from which we hope God will
protect us." Videotape: Osama Bin Laden, cited in Bin Laden's Warning:FullText,
BBC News, Oct. 7, 2001, available at www.news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/south-asia/
1585636.stm.
35. See generally David A. Westbrook, Islamic InternationalLaw and Public
InternationalLaw: Separate Expressions of World Order, 33 VIRGINIA J. INT'L LAW
819 (1993) (discussing the bifurcation between belief and disbelief).
36. The Boeings, however, were apparently seized with very primitive weapons,
box cutters. So the destruction of the World Trade Center Towers were accomplished with a peculiar mixture of ultramodern and most primitive technologies,
computers and knives.
37. In another mixture of the ultramodern and the primitive, however, the
disks themselves are often encrypted and then physically transported, making electronic interception of their communications impossible.
38. See, e.g., Douglas Farah, Al Qaeda's Road Paved With Gold; Secret Shipments Traced Through a Lax System in United Arab Emirates, WASH. POST, Feb. 17,
2002, at Al; Mark Galeotti, Drugs Fund War, WORLD TODAY, Dec. 12, 2001, at 12
("The global narcotics trade is central to the 'war against terrorism' and military operations against Osama Bin Laden's Al Qaeda organization. It funds all sides in the
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5. Al Qaeda appears to have taken short positions on various international equity markets in order to profit from
their foreknowledge of the losses of September 11th. 9
Short selling is hardly the action of folks who are not
comfortable with the heart of globalization, the financial
markets. °
6. Bin Laden himself traveled widely, showing no particular tie to a geographical location. The Sudan and Afghanistan are thousands of miles apart and bin Laden
himself was Saudi. He was a terrorist analogue of the
modern high tech worker with only a notional home.
7. Finally, the scope of al Qaeda's operations was nearly
global. The organization was linked to terrorist attacks
in countries including Indonesia, Kenya, Tanzania, the
Philippines, the United States, and Yemen. In addition,
al Qaeda operated out of many countries, including Afghanistan, Canada, Germany, Sudan, and Saudi Arabia.4 '
As cosmopolitan as al Qaeda is in some ways, it is not the
cosmopolitan character of the network that prevents us from
understanding their terrorism as a protest against globalization
and interpreting September 11th as a conflict between some
pre-modern perspective and our modernity. Nor does the impropriety of understanding killing as argument inhibit the U.S.
Afghan civil war, as well as a substantial proportion of Al Qaeda's operations.");
Roula Khalaf, US Seeks More Saudi Assistance on Terrorism, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 29,
2002, (noting Saudi displeasure at the listing of several Saudi nationals and charities on the U.S. Treasury list of groups whose assets must be frozen); Syed Saleem
Shahzad, How Osama bin Laden Really Builds His Fortune, ASIAN TIMES ONLINE,
Sept. 20, 2001, at www.atimes.com/ind-pak/CI2ODf03.html; Department of Defense,
Background Briefing on the Al Qaeda Terrorist Network, Feb. 19, 2002, available at
www.defenselink.mil ("[T]he way al Qaeda financed itself was multifaceted.").
39. Adam Cohen, How Bin Laden Funds His Network, Oct. 1, 2001, at www.
time.com. See also Press Release, Securities and Exchange Commission, Request
Relating to Information Pertaining to the Terrorist Attacks (Oct. 18, 2001), at
http://www.sec.gov/ news/press./2001-115.txt.
40. Interpretations vary, but in general, the Islamic tradition constrains the
charging of interest (riba), in ways akin to Christian injunctions against usury.
Short selling, generally through derivative instruments, indicates a comfort with
financial arrangements far more complex - and so morally opaque - than mere interest, however exorbitant.
41. As of March 6, 2002, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld reported that Al Qaeda
was operating in between thirty and sixty countries. Editorial, Daschleand Gardez,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 6, 2002, at A16. See also U.S. INFO. OFFICE, MAP OF COUNTRIES
WHERE AL QAEDA HAS OPERATED, available at http://usinfo.state.gov/pro
ducts/pubs/terrornet/12.htm (last visited Mar. 2, 2002) (including appended list of
forty-five countries).
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chattering class from seeing September 11th as a serious antithesis to the historical trends we call globalization. We perforce understand September 11th in terms of globalization and
other familiar political tropes because insignificant numbers of
us have intellectual equipment that would allow us to do much
otherwise.
To understand a foreign culture, or even to understand
one's own culture in the highly conscious terms required for serious comparison, is exceedingly difficult work. It takes time
and insight. Consequently, in the wake of September 11th we
saw intellectual concern shift to questions that, while not irrelevant, were more notable for their availability. We immediately
worried about issues such as U.S. adherence to the U.N. Charter
(as if the Charter governed conflict in today's world); whether
the investigations into terrorism would usher in an era of
McCarthyism; racial injustice; rules of evidence for criminals;
and treatment of prisoners. Europeans worried about U.S.
power and our relationship with Israel. How easy. Evidently,
for policy discourse, September 11th changed almost nothing,
and we were left to confront the world with tried and tested arguments drawn from popular history. The war on terrorism has
thus been rendered more politics, internal to modern conceptions of the world including globalization, rather than some
form of argument through deeds against modernity. September
11th has become a symbol of our anxiety - as if we needed another - but no more. In terms of our large scale politics, the
course of history and suchlike, the events of September 11th did
not change everything, and that which was fundamental to a
worldview has remained so.
That is not to say that there was nothing new in the world
after September 11th. For example, the war on terrorism has
presented many problems for established ideas of international
law, which remains largely defined in terms of autonomous nation states even though law professors have pointed out ad
nauseum that the international legal environment is not comprised solely by such actors. The classical theory of international law is dead, but it rules us from the grave.4" And so we
have had problems saying what "the law" is with regard to al
Qaeda, in large part for the simple reason that al Qaeda is not a
state. But never in the modern era had it been necessary to
42.
FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, EQUITY AND THE FORMS OF ACTION 296 (1st
ed. 1909) ("The forms of action we have buried, but they still rule us from their
graves.").
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deal with a non-governmental organization capable of inflicting
losses on the same scale as a national military.
More generally, we still require a new grammar through
which to think about the violent acts we commit. It is clear that
neither the classical formulation of the law in war nor the text
of the UN Charter adequately articulates the felt necessities of
the armed interventions that have become increasingly common
since the end of the Cold War. For familiar example, how are
prisoners in the war against terror like those accused by the
criminal justice system (how does war relate to crime)? Both
warfare and criminal law are forceful expressions of the state,
but we still need to think about the formalization of our violence. For now it suffices to say that on September 11th the international community did not have, and does not yet have, a
firm and formal, and in that sense, legal, articulation of the
rules governing the kinds of politically organized violence we
now routinely conduct. With regard to this aspect of our lives
among
one another, we are not yet as lawful as we might like to
43
be.

We are working out solutions to such difficulties. We are
entering a time of law-making, a jurisgenerative phase. Particularly at first, we can expect the efforts of the international
community (and especially the United States) in this regard to
be somewhat ad hoc, improvisational, and therefore less than
perfectly consistent. Moreover, the United States and other nations will resist any notion of law that purports to constrain or
even rationalize their ability to defend themselves, or, more
broadly, to protect vital interests.44 But that the hyperpower
will resist efforts to get it to promise to recognize the authority
of congeries of foreign bureaucrats is hardly surprising and does
not change the inevitability of rationalistic formal articulation
(and by "law" I mean little else) of the issues raised by September 11th. Terrorist attacks of this magnitude and the international cooperation required to punish the perpetrators and prevent similar acts must give rise to new international law.
Consider cash flows, airports, data privacy, ethnic profiling, uni43. I do not say reflexively (as an international legalist should) that we need
further legal articulation. To claim that law is the answer at this point in the argument would require an implicit position vis-a-vis law and modernity that I am not at
present prepared to make. Indeed, the difficulty lawyers have with a surfeit of law
is at the heart of this piece, and is addressed directly at the conclusion of the next
essay, Island on the Horizon of Desire.
44. The obvious examples at present are the U.S. refusal to participate in the
International Criminal Court and unilateral U.S. action in Iraq and elsewhere.
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university study - such matters almost inevitably will be objects
of legalization, and such legalization will most likely be international in character. Not only will such new laws reflect a time of
globalization, they will in fact be engines of globalization.
September 11th also raised classic problems of international law, and here too we have already seen the first stirrings
of new law. In a speech on the evening of September 17, 2001,
President Bush announced what some have called the "Bush
doctrine."45 The Bush doctrine is the idea that no distinction
will be made between terrorists and states that harbor terrorists. 46 States that harbor terrorists will be considered to be responsible for the terrorist's acts. So what had been a "terrorist
act," i.e., a crime, is thereby converted into an "armed attack."
As that term is used in international law, an armed attack triggers rights to self-defense, rights that we saw exercised when
the U.S. and British forces attacked the Taliban. 7
The Bush doctrine almost immediately accomplished a
number of things on behalf of the civilized order. First, on its
face, it helped to punish the guilty. At domestic law, helping
murderers is a crime. A state that has others do its killing is
certainly culpable and ought to be punished. Second, the civilized world, and the United States in particular, could not absorb al Qaeda's attacks indefinitely without responding. But al
Qaeda is not a government. It represents no territory and
therefore presents no stationary, well-defined military objectives. The Bush doctrine, to be blunt, gave the U.S. military a
target, namely the Taliban.
The real importance of the Bush doctrine, however, lay in
its secondary and higher order effects. The doctrine compels regimes to police their populations, lest they be deemed to harbor
45. President Bush said: "Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists.
From this day forward, any nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism will
be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime." Bush, supra note 30. For
discussion of this as the Bush doctrine, see Michael J. Glennon, Forging a Third
Way to Fight: "Bush doctrine" for Combating Terrorism Straddles Divide Between
Crime and War, LEGAL TIMES, Sept. 24, 2001, at 68, available at http://www5
.law.com/lawcom/displayid.cfm?statename=DC&docnum=87562&table=news&flag=f
ull.
46. Glennon, supra note 45, at 68.
47. Under classical international law, harboring terrorists could be considered
an act of war. In order to declare war, however, the aggrieved state had to demand
that the state allegedly harboring the terrorists surrender them. In announcing the
Bush doctrine, the President did not acknowledge an obligation to make a formal
demand on a foreign government. In fact, however, the Bush administration made
demand on the Taliban for bin Laden and was refused.
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terrorists, and treated as terrorists themselves, i.e., killed or at
least removed from their positions of power and otherwise punished. In order to avoid such treatment, the Bush doctrine requires regimes to realize the traditional understanding of what
a state is - the institutions of society that collectively possess a
monopoly of force. The Bush doctrine thus forces putative states
to become in fact what they already are conceived to be. Conceived, that is, in the conventional modern (once Western, now
nearly universal) view; effective policemen, not just domestically, but for the world order. The Bush doctrine thus uses war,
or the threat of war, to establish lawful political order.
In order to be so compelled, it is not necessary that a regime
actually harbor a terrorist and that the terrorist actually commit an act of violence. The Bush doctrine forces states into alliances. Every nation, said President Bush, has a choice regarding which side it wishes to be on in the war against terrorism.48
There is no neutrality. The state, which may only barely be a
state, is forced to participate (act like a state) in the organization of an international civil order that can police the globe. In
so doing, the state becomes a modern - or perhaps post-modern
- political entity, defined by its participation rather than its
autonomy or independence from outside interference.
The Bush doctrine would seem to have an obvious limitation. One can easily imagine a situation in which the "state"
had no practical recourse against terrorists operating from
within its borders.49 Some governments are simply not in control of the people in their territory. If a state cannot control a
terrorist organization located within its borders, then the international legal order may threaten or even harm the state without having any effect on the terrorists. From this perspective, it
might be argued that the Bush doctrine is ineffectual where it is
most needed. This perspective, however, misses the deeper
function of the doctrine. To understand the ineffectiveness of a
given state as a limitation on the civilized legal order is to miss
the point that the state is defined, as a state, by its ability to
participate in the world order. A state that will not or cannot
48. See Bush, supra note 30.
49. It would be interesting to know the course of bin Laden's negotiations with
the Taliban. The dramatist in me would like to believe that the Taliban, or many of
them, were conned: bin Laden appears as a rich Islamic war hero, who wants to
grace their country and will pay and fight as necessary. What is a gang of impoverished students not to like? In this drama, the students were unable to admit that
they were gulled into giving up a great deal of effective control, and ultimately even
their lives. But this is sheer speculation on my part.
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control terrorists within its borders is ipso facto no longer entitled to the deference associated with sovereignty. An ineffective
state is a failed state. Thus the Bush doctrine either forces
states to act like states and police their territory, or admit that
they have failed and therefore may be reconstituted. Far from
saying the state is irrelevant, the Bush doctrine says about
states what Voltaire did about God: If states didn't exist, we
would have to invent them.50
This is a switch from classical international law, which
tended to presume the state. Admittedly, within the classical
view there were some difficulties in determining whether or not
a state existed in cases involving civil wars, disputed territories,
and so forth. The received solutions to such problems were
called doctrines of recognition. Objective ("declaratory") doctrines of recognition attempted to set forth the indicia of a
state's existence; subjective ("constitutive") doctrines argued
that the state comes into existence when it is recognized by the
community of states. Even with the aid of such doctrines, however, the problems remained difficult. A state, after all, has always been a rather metaphysical thing, and in some cases, it
has been hard to tell whether or not one should say a state existed. Doctrinal disputes over the existence of a state were
rather finely wrought, real angels on pinheads stuff, but the important point for present purposes is that such arguments were
relatively factual: The question for classical international law
was to determine whether a state actually existed in a given
situation, so that other states might begin making treaties and
establishing customs and otherwise doing international law.
The current situation is importantly different. The global
polity cannot afford countries like the Afghanistan of 1980-2000.
After September 11th, we felt both compelled and right - in
some important if still inchoate way we felt it was legal - not
only to revenge ourselves upon bin Laden and al Qaeda, but to
topple the Taliban, and to (re)build the state, indeed the nation,
to impose modernity. As the playwright Peter Handke put it,
thinking about Yugoslavia, "[t]his is not a people, just a mere
entity. This is no country, just a gray zone. And gray zones can
no longer be tolerated geopolitically."5' Contemporary public in50. FRANCOIS MARIE AROUT DE VOLTAIRE, EPITRE A L'AUTEUR DU LIVRE DES
TROIS IMPOSTEURS 2 (1770).
51. PETER HANDKE, DIE FAHRT IM EINBAUM, ODER, DAS STUECK ZUM FILM VOM
KRIEG [TRAVELLING [sic] BY DUGOUT, OR THE PLAY ABOUT THE FILM ABOUT THE
WAR] 93 (1999), quoted in Westbrook, supra note 22, at 329 n.34 (author's own
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ternational law seeks to require that business be conducted
through recognizable bureaucratic machinery, in most cases,
through a state. We need states. This is why we have ended up
in Yugoslavia, in East Timor,
and elsewhere - replacing failed
52
states and nation building.
At least until recently, however, we waited until the state in
question actually failed, and failed miserably. From both humanitarian and security perspectives, we waited far too long.
The Bush doctrine is an expression of the idea that the global
security order cannot tolerate large spaces outside the jurisdiction of a responsible state. Where public international law once
asked whether a state existed as a matter of fact, or at least as a
matter of common consensus, contemporary public international
law asks whether a given regime can fulfill the international obligations of a state. Most importantly, can the putative state
control its inhabitants? This is the new sovereignty - in which
the nation is defined in terms of its ability to participate, as opposed to the traditional understanding of sovereignty as autonomy - with a vengeance." The nation has not been abolished; it
has been redefined as an administrative unit of the global polity. Governments that do not fulfill their critical obligations will
be relabeled regimes, like the Taliban, and replaced at the option of the civilized world. From this perspective, the response
to September 11th looks like the prelude to an extension of
global society into a remote corner of the planet.
Attempting to articulate what I thought we had done in
Kosovo and elsewhere, I wrote the following:
The civilized world, at its best, judges barbarians in the hope of converting them, of creating order so that human intercourse may flow
through the channels of politics rather than down the sinews of war.
All of our wars, even little adventures in oil rich regions, must therefore be wars to end all wars, must be justified in terms of an enlightened hope for human fruition, must be efforts to impose
law. We mod54
erns fight wars in order to prepare people for politics.

translation).
52. Despite its early rhetoric, the Bush administration has been faulted for not
working hard enough to ensure that the new Afghanistan is a political success.
There is some sense that the administration has changed its priorities on this front.
See Richard Holbrooke, Letters to the Editor: Long-Term Dangers in Afghanistan,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 29, 2002, at A13.
53. See generally ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW
SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS

vard University Press 1995).

54.

Westbrook, supra note 22, at 346.

(Har-
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The same holds true with regard to Afghanistan and in time the
other havens of terrorism. None of which is to say that we will
become one bourgeois world in fact. We may not succeed in integrating Afghanistan into the international order. We may be
unwilling to discipline a barbaric regime that poses little threat
beyond its borders and which is powerful enough to be a necessary participant in international affairs. But it seems clear that
if such places cannot be quarantined or their sins ignored, as is
the case with at least Afghanistan, then integration is the only
thing we know how to do.
Integration is not merely political. Winning the peace
means the establishment of a social order, a degree of economic
integration, and consequently, a process of acculturation. So we
must still talk about globalization, especially after the events of
September 11th. At home, we are not about to stop markets,
particularly now that shopping has become a patriotic obligation, and trade has been equated with civilization. (For our civilization, created by globalization, the equation is true enough.)
More interestingly, we must talk about globalization in the
heart of what appears, at first blush, to be old fashioned national power politics. Although serious questions remain concerning specific determinations, e.g., who counts as a barbarian
on a given day, and how weapons may be deployed, these are
mere lawyers' questions. Globalization has already gone much
further than we are accustomed to acknowledging. Globalization has gone so far that we have difficulty recognizing how it
has reshaped the ways in which we can think about international politics, and so law. The question before us is not what
law defines a peace with an adversary. The question is how to
make an international order that we recognize as peaceful
enough, and in that very limited sense, just. Far from changing
everything for us, September 11th has forced us to confess our
commitments to a globalized vision of what it is to be modern.
III. AN ISLAND ON THE HORIZON OF DESIRE
At the reflective end of summer, I found myself on Ocracoke
Island, perched above Silver Lake Harbor, watching the sunset,
eating Thai food, and contemplating a thing of power and
beauty, an ocean-going catamaran. Rumor later claimed the
boat to be more than 70 feet long, over 30 feet wide, and the
number a man remembers, the tip of the mast to be 105 feet
above the water. Perhaps these numbers were true; I have little
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experience judging such things. What I can say is that each hull
rose from the water like a white cliff, the cabin had the odd angles familiar from pictures of "stealthy" military aircraft, and I
looked up from our third story deck to the light atop the mast,
twinkling ever brighter as darkness fell. The boat was stunning. The men in a village reachable only by boat and small
plane could be seen on docks, on the street, shamelessly staring.
I wondered where she - the pronoun seemed necessary for such
an object of desire - was from, where she was going, who controlled such a craft, and most of all, what it cost to be so regarded.
My wife and I have vacationed on Ocracoke over a number
of years, but we had never seen a boat like that. For that matter, we never had been able to get Thai take-out either. Although we had not seen such things on the island before, we
were not entirely surprised by their appearance. Shortly before
our vacation, The Wall Street Journal published a lengthy survey of beaches, on which Ocracoke was included, and was far
and away the most interesting beach discussed.55 Perhaps there
was some connection to the so New York statement by some
travel writer I noticed somewhere - buzz is difficult to recall that her favorite place for lunch was an obscure deli operated
out of a backroad store owned by a family that had lived on the
island for many generations. Plainly, Ocracoke had become
fashionable, desirable to many when it had once been known
only to a few. The signs were everywhere. Cars sported license
plates from all over the country. The local paper had been
bought by a woman with dot.com money. The service personnel,
once exclusively local, had become exotic in more familiar ways:
beautiful girls from Quebec served Seattle-style coffee and cavorted with boys whose lithe semi-nude bodies were decorated
and pierced. Some of the staff were even from Mexico. Rent
was higher than we remembered, and terms had become inflexible. Had I known these things before this last visit, I would almost have expected the excellent chicken with basil and red
chilies, and that catamaran, the plaything of the superrich.
Ocracoke had become someplace in the world of money.
This is a matter of importance to those of us who love the island for a certain set of attributes, for what we might, in a moment of weakness common among "sophisticated travelers" de-

55.

Nancy Keates, In Search of the Perfect Beach, WALL ST. J., May 25, 2001, at

20031

TRIPTYCH

scribe as the "authentic charm" of the place. But how long, I
wondered over the next few days, sauteing scallops with butter
and lime, or swimming in the Atlantic without benefit of lifeguards, how long can such charm last, now that Ocracoke is so
fashionable? The United States is a land of last great places,
but few of them remain great. Most U.S. places become much
like many other U.S. places, and hence somewhat boring. Not
only the elegiac tone but also the number of the Ocracoke books
for sale in the bookstores and galleries suggested that the island
way of life was beautiful but perhaps already had past. (Fishermen require many coffee table books and weak paintings of
the seaside?) The very presence of people like me, eating Thai
food, might mean that the special character of Ocracoke was
fading, or already lost. We have met globalization, to paraphrase Pogo, and it is us. We have reached the island we saw
upon the horizon, only to find its beguilement gone.
Our beguilement depends, it seems, upon relative social location: We are enchanted by things we desire but do not yet possess, by the island we can see but have not yet reached. If the
island is known to only a few, then it is exotic. Travelers can
tell tales. Once an island becomes known to all, however, the
enchantment fades. Familiarity breeds contempt, or more
harshly still, we cherish that which is envied but not possessed
by others. On the other hand, enchanting places cannot be totally unknown, because then they could not be desired. We cannot long for what we cannot imagine. To be beguiling, then, a
place must be perceptible to, but not yet possessed by, society.
It must be an island just visible upon the horizon of the world.
We wish, at the end of summer, to return from an island that
our neighbors have heard about but not yet visited.
For the first several centuries of its existence, indeed until
living memory, Ocracoke was essentially unknown, and so beyond the horizon of mainland fashion. I have heard that the
Ditch (the connection between Silver Lake Harbor and Pamlico
Sound, and thence the ocean) was only four feet deep, and consequently the harbor was restricted to skiffs and other very
shallow-drafted craft. Locals still call Silver Lake the "Creek,"
because for several hundred years, that was all it was. In the
late 1930's, however, the federal government dredged the harbor, and even stationed naval forces there during World War II.
Back then, the island had no real roads, although cars were occasionally brought over on private boats and driven down the
sand packed hard by the receding tide. The island's road was
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not built until 1952, at which time the wild Ocracoke ponies
("Banker" ponies, thought to be descended from Spanish Mustangs) were penned. A man who remembered visiting the island
as a boy in the 1950s told me it took all day to come over on the
mail boat, a reconditioned trawler. At that time, only a few
hundred outsiders visited the island in a given year. Shortly
thereafter, however, the North Carolina Department of Transportation made the island more accessible by establishing a
regular ferry service that now runs between Ocracoke and Hatteras Island, Cedar Island, and the mainland, at the remote
hamlet of Swan Quarter.
Although geographically isolated, Ocracoke has a long if
episodic recorded history, reaching back to Europe's early efforts
in the New World. The island was visited by members of Raleigh's party in 1585. They decided to move a few islands to the
North, to Roanoke, whence they would disappear into conjecture
and legend. A small community of pilots established itself to
guide ships through the shoals around Ocracoke Inlet. In 1718,
the outside world asserted itself: British naval troops under the
command of Lieutenant Robert Maynard killed Blackbeard the
Pirate in a ferocious hand to hand battle in Pamlico Sound, just
beyond the harbor. That remains the highpoint of island history. Although both the Revolutionary and Civil Wars were contested in the area, it is said that Ocracokers themselves tended
to stand rather aloof from such outside affairs, and generally
seemed willing to trade. A few generations on, during World
War II, German U-Boats sank U.S. shipping offshore; a cross in
the village is made from the wreckage of one of the torpedoed
ships. English sailors' corpses washed ashore from the HMS
Bedfordshire in 1942 and lay buried in a village cemetery.
But these are dramatic highlights, relatively seldom moments when Ocracoke and the outside world paid attention to
one another. For over three hundred years, the people of the island lived strikingly alone with the sea and the wind. Isolated
in time and space, Ocracokers developed their own ways of doing things, told their own stories, and preserved and developed
patterns of speech unheard elsewhere. In short, Ocracoke developed its own character. Despite being on the East Coast of
the United States, the island remained a place apart, or from
the perspective of the island, Ocracoke constituted a world.
Perhaps it appears small to us, but the ocean, the marshes, the
sound, and the community of the village at least once comprised
a world quite large enough for living, or losing, a life.
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There is no doubt that its separation from the United States
is what first attracted my wife and me, then corporate lawyers
practicing in Washington, D.C., to the island. Even today, Ocracoke is relatively inaccessible. The island can be reached only
by private plane or water. There are no direct flights; indeed, no
airports or major cities are very close. Nor is driving to the ferries easy. On reaching the island, one quickly realizes how far
away it all is. Nags Head, the nearest town of any size whatsoever, is seventy-eight miles away, including a ferry ride that,
with loading and unloading and assuming there is space, takes
the burden of an hour. Though not as cut off as it was before
the 1950's, even today Ocracoke is out there, poked into the Atlantic. A supermarket, movie theater, hospital, or car dealership are hours away. Most importantly, once on the island, one
cannot even see the mainland. (Thoughts of hurricanes sulk
about the corners of the mind.)
We go to Ocracoke, or to any other beach, to get away from
it all. Scary cliche, that, but what does it mean? Few of us have
Gauguin's talent, but many of us have some inkling of what he
was up to in Tahiti. When we are at the beach, we eat and
drink more. We expose ourselves and see the nakedness, or
near nakedness, of others. We have sex more often. We live on
a level of physicality that everyday life, at least among the upper middle class, does not allow, suppresses. To turn away from
polite everyday society to the nearly nude culture of the beach to get away from it all - is thus implicitly a rejection, however
temporary, of modernity, an effort to strip away the clutter of a
life, leaving only some essential core. We recreate ourselves
(another scary thought, that we should need to be remade),
selves that had somehow been obscured by life in civilization.
Ocracoke is an especially good beach for contemplating the
horror of culture. The sense of isolation pervades the island itself, even the beaches during high season. The entire beachfront, and the vast majority of the island, is a national seashore.
The town itself is tiny. It is possible to be on a beautiful beach
in July and not see another person. The desire to go skinny
dipping can be overwhelming. Ocracoke's beach itself has a
stripped down feel. The elements are few, but all strong. The
sun is intense, but not as fierce as the wind, which often blows
abrasive sand down the beach. There are no trees visible from
the beach, but there are bugs - the backside of the island, facing
the Sound, is all marsh - and many of them bite. High waves
and rip tides are commonplace. Bad storms are also common.

MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE

[Vol. 12:2

One does not go to the shore on Ocracoke; one stands on a sandbar and confronts the Atlantic. But somehow, these privations,
the very aggressive qualities of the place, accentuate the fundamental point of going to the beach - to recover some essential
things, and to wonder at what one has become.
To be venal, or perhaps just realistic, it must be acknowledged that we have become beachgoers, mere consumers. My
wife and I are hardly alone in our desire to get away from it all
on Ocracoke. What had been a few hundred annual visitors to
the island in the 1950's has become a few hundred thousand.
And one might reasonably ask in what sense vacationing on a
fashionable island with several thousand like-minded folks is
getting away from it all. In some enormous bait-and-switch, social fraud on a grand scale, an island vacation promises a respite from the real world, and instead again instantiates familiar
markets, in real estate, dining, and so forth. But this should
hardly be surprising. Not just the beach, not just Gauguin, but
rebellion generally can be commodified. If people want rebellion, markets that provide experiences that seem to be rebellious
will arise. Witness not only beaches, but rock music, which
moved from rebellion to industry in less than a generation.
Witness the host of products (ranging from tattoos to climbing
gear) intended to express "individuality." While true rebellion
may not be for sale, in the meantime we spend and spend, hoping somehow to become something other than consumers.
There is something almost tragic about this. The market private law - enables us to satisfy our desires, to visit the islands on our horizons. In their very achievement, however,
businesses accomplish their own undoing. The frontiersmen
tamed the U.S. wilderness, but well-kept farms and prosperous
towns do not need frontiersmen. The frontiersmen's successes
made them obsolete. Something similar can be said for any
people whose place and way of life become, for a while, an example of the authenticity for which cosmopolites hunger, that is,
who serve a tourist trade. The people come; fashion shifts; resorts fade; devil take the hindmost. A long drive down U.S.
Highway 1, the beach highway of yesteryear, should remind us
how fickle our desires are, how fragile are our fulfillments.
And here we are close to the fears behind our worries over
globalization. We will visit a place until it is no longer strange,
until it has become banal and visiting it pointless. For a while,
of course, a new object of desire will be substituted for the old.
A new vacation island will appear upon the horizon. But we are
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running out of islands. Intensely local worlds like Ocracoke
seem to be vanishing, out of keeping with those far-flung historical processes we refer to as globalization. And what of we
fashion seekers, who move restlessly from one place to the next,
until the question "where are you from" appears quaint. At
some point, we realize that there is no island where we can get
away from it all, that the market for travel has not satisfied our
need for perspective. We realize, instead, that we have lost the
possibility of a sense of place. Through markets, we cosmopolites may achieve our own undoing, may unravel our pleasure in
our worldliness, as surely as the frontiersmen committed suicide
over the course of a long generation. The United States, now
the planet, tends toward cosmopolitan boredom.
But it is not just the market that reduces enchantment to
familiarity, and so threatens boredom. Anthropologists - a term
I use loosely, to include even law professors - discuss why this
or that place, moment, culture, is special. So we hear that the
Ocracoker's brogue retains traces of Elizabethan English, long
since lost to most other parts of the United States. But perhaps
not all other places: the educated Southerner, growing up with
Eliot Wigginton's Foxfire series, will recall similar claims for
Southern Appalachia,56 or, come to think of it, the Chesapeake
region.
Perhaps there are other places that might support
such claims, but these are enough to begin recognizing the
proposition that someplace retains authentic traces of Elizabethan English as a Southern trope. Such tropes quite possibly
are true, but that is not the point here. As tropes, ways in
which Southerners remark the world and so recognize one another, such claims are kin to Jefferson's Virginia, Huck Finn,
and all of Faulkner and Ransome and the rest of the Southern
Agrarians and a passel of lesser lights. That is, "Elizabethan
English" is a form of subtle protest against the hegemony of a
society that understands the world as if it were a market.
Such protests are not without pathos, perhaps especially
when they are true. To whom are such claims addressed? To
the international society of social scientists? To the national
universities that grant professional status? To Walker Percy's
young Southerner, just back from Princeton?5 8 Anthropologists
56. See, e.g., ROBERT MCCRUM ET AL., THE STORY OF ENGLISH (Faber & Faber
1986). See generally THE FOXFIRE BOOKS (Elliot Wigginton & Susan Coopers, eds.
1973-1985).
57. See generally MCCRUM, supra note 56.
58. See generally WALKER PERCY, THE LAST GENTLEMAN (Eyre & Spottiswoode
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go so far as to claim that insular speech and folkways should be

preserved, as we struggle to preserve biodiversity, because such
exceptions from the homogeneity of the broader society constitute an opportunity for linguistic and cultural studies. That is,
particular and local lives are justified because they are necessary for the construction of a general and cosmopolitan, if
merely academic, worldview. This hypocrisy is regrettable but
to some extent unavoidable. Any argument I might make for a
particular time and place is bound to be hypocritical, because I
personally have so little time or place. My entire education has
been an effort to abolish home, at least home understood with
the intensity and particularity of a place like Ocracoke. More
charitably, my education has been an effort to construct a larger
world, a world in which it makes sense to look at a very rich
man's catamaran, eat Thai food, and muse on the German UBoat sinking of U.S. ships carrying arms to England besieged.
Ocracoke has been recognized; Ocracoke is a place to be; Ocracoke has become part of the larger world. Now that Ocracoke is
on the cosmopolite's map, the possibility of a local perspective
and the possibility of a truly local character have been abolished, even if we still think we hear traces of the Virgin Queen's
English.
It seems one cannot easily remain on the horizon, at the
edge of the world. One cannot long talk of obscurity. Indeed,
obscurity only makes sense in light of subsequent revelation.
Travels are bothersome things, unless there is a traveler's tale
to transform privation into adventure, perhaps even learning.
Gauguin returned from Tahiti, which could not be Tahiti without Paris, before setting out for the Solomons to die. Robert
Louis Stevenson also died on an island, but he never stopped
publishing in London. The desire to rebel against modernity
tends to subvert itself, not just because participation in a market entails complicity, but also because rebellion is itself political. Escapes, rebellions, critiques are reactions against society,
but ultimately such matters must be validated by the very society that prompted the rebellion. And so, after getting away
from it all, I find myself writing an open letter, this essay, to the
culture that I time and again seek to escape. In so doing, I have
done my bit to make Ocracoke part of the reader's world, and
1967).
59. See generally WALT WOLFRAM & NATALIE SCHILLING-ESTES, Hoi TOIDE ON
THE OUTER BANKS: THE STORY OF OCRACOKE BROGUE (University of North Carolina
Press 1997).
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thereby made it less isolated, less of an escape, less of the place
I love.
The threat of banality (if we understand participation in our
society to be banal, and what beachgoer does not?) is thus a condition of our creating our world, is part and parcel of cosmopolitan existence, in which we relate particular times, places, experiences, and even people to the panelopy of alternative times,
places, experiences, and even people potentially available to a
middle class life. In doing so, we make things familiar, until
many people respond to much of life with some version of been
there and done that. The banality of modern life for which the
customary image is McDonald's is not merely the result of trade
flows or some other process we casually recognize as globalization, but results from the market's success in providing choice,
and even satisfying immediate desire.
The practical question, for the United States and now the
world, is how can we remain interested in where we live? Can
we keep the threat of banality from being fulfilled? Can anything be done to keep our islands, and indeed neighborhoods,
somewhat unattainable, and hence desirable, worth striving for?
The obvious answer, in a market society, is to raise the
price. Staying on the East Coast, places like South Beach, the
Hamptons and Marblehead are hardly unknown, but are nonetheless wonderful places for lunch. The exclusivity of knowledge
and the adventure of finding something new can be replaced
with the exclusivity of a high price. To some extent, this is already happening on Ocracoke, that is, real estate prices are rising. As prices rise, those who can still afford to pay are entitled
to congratulate themselves on their good fortune and, in particular, to enjoy being admired by their community. Being rich and
exciting envy is mildly interesting, if not exactly beguiling.
Yet the exclusivity of price, while it may keep the island on
the horizon and so desirable, is an imperfect substitute for character. Owning a great sailboat does not make one a great sailor.
Buying a private island does not make that island a particularly
interesting place. In fact, just the opposite: the countless
planned communities that line the Atlantic Coast with their designer golf courses, manicured lawns, and stunning swimming
pools are more than pleasant enough situations for fine bodies
and decent food, but remain uninteresting. Constructed in order to please the market, such communities are as familiar as
the next catalogue. Conversely, making Ocracoke terribly expensive might limit access, but it will limit access to the people
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- fishermen, sailors, families - whose lives are the island's his-

tory and who collectively have given the place its character.
One could, with effort, imagine Ocracoke a beautiful resort. But
that would be a very different island from what is still in part a
working village - less than a thousand souls in the winter built upon a spit of sand.
In fact, however, the island is unlikely to become the sort of
resort threatened in the preceding paragraph. Ocracoke probably will remain something of a place apart, an island in the
middle distance if no longer on the horizon, for three reasons:
geography, water, and law. Even today, the island requires a
hard day's drive or chartered plane connections from any major
city. From the East Coast it is easier to travel to most European
capitals, and countless U.S. beaches, in less time than it takes
to reach Ocracoke. Due to its location in the Atlantic, the
weather is frequently brutal, which further diminishes the limited time the beach is available to most vacationers. In addition, the island has very little fresh water. It is unclear how
much more building, if any, the island's water supply can sustain. Finally, the island is not large, and most of it is part of the
Cape Hatteras National Seashore. As a result of the National
Seashore, very little land is available for development of any
sort, and none is on the beach.
Taken together, these factors should help Ocracoke retain
much of its character. My wife and I have been pleasantly surprised at how slowly the island's real estate market has developed over the years. Upon reflection, however, perhaps this
relative price stability should not be so surprising. While we
love the place, Ocracoke simply cannot provide many of the
amenities that have become standard among high wage earners.
Those who go to the effort required to visit Ocracoke really want
to be there and want to be there for the reasons that make
Ocracoke what it is. Ocracoke certainly will change - all places
do - but the island bids fair to remain a special place. And that,
in the United States, is an accomplishment.
There is a lesson to be learned here, that may help those of
us who live elsewhere to keep our homes interesting, too, and so
to retain affection for our circumstances. While those who care
about Ocracoke's character are simply lucky that the island is
remote and dry, the principal reason that Ocracoke is likely to
remain interesting is very human: the federal government has
declared most of the island to be national seashore, "the Park."
Without Cape Hatteras and Cape Lookout National Seashores,
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the entire beachfront of the Outer Banks would be dominated by
vacation houses, distance and water problems notwithstanding.
Money and technology can overcome mere physical obstacles
like distance and a lack of water. Without law in the form of the
Park, the village might well become a town, or even towns, no
doubt with strip malls and, in due course, fast food and minigolf. Because of the Park, however, the beach will remain beautiful in perpetuity. And, what land is for sale will remain valuable. More importantly, Ocracoke will remain a place where one
can get away, not from it all, but from enough of it to clear the
head.
The broader lesson here is counterintuitive for those who
believe in markets, as most Americans (and I) do. While optimism is a national trait and a useful thing for entrepreneurs,
our optimism makes it difficult for us to understand how markets can be tragic contexts. But any open-eyed drive through
the United States should make it clear how the very achievement of private interests so often has spelled the death of a
market in which individuals tried to achieve their dreams. Like
tragic heroes, businesses often contain the seeds of their own
undoing. Assuming we wish to retain a given market for the
long haul, as we might for markets in beautiful places, or even
places where Americans build their houses and make their lives,
then we may find it wise to restrict that market's scope. Ocracoke is a case in point: the federalization of so much of the land
prevents the market from operating, and thereby destroying itself, that is, the Park prevents overdevelopment. And back of
the proposition that markets are essentially tragic contexts, often best restrained, is an even darker lesson, blasphemy for a
market society: Our happiness may require us to make some
peace with our frustrations.
Private law has traditionally understood itself as the authoritative articulation of legitimate desires, desires whose fulfillment would command the respect of the state and, if necessary, call forth the state's forceful capabilities. Modernity, now
globalization, raises the possibility that the desires that come to
be uppermost in the public breast involve living in, or at least
being able to visit, spaces which have not yet been fully articulated. We moderns often wish to get away from it all, believe
that global civilization is a sort of virus. More deeply still, we
cannot deny the nausea that modem life arouses, a feeling of
surfeit. Too much has been thought and written and said and
argued... and for even the successful among us, it is time to go
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to the beach, perhaps engage in some (literally) mindless hedonism, do whatever it takes to shut the chattering down. Young
men and other malcontents may choose more violent forms of
rebellion.
Our longing for some space outside culture, for wilderness,
leads us to ask for a law of wilderness, a fence that marks the
edge of our modernity, beyond which lies a kind of freedom.
Public law, we hope and I suggest above, can bound a civilization articulated through private law, and can thereby avert the
tragedy of markets - the tragedy of desires pursued to their
logical conclusions.
But public law, too, is engaged in a tragic project, tragic
both in its ambition and its claustral impossibility. How are we
to think the end of modern articulation, if not through further
articulations of thinking (and writing, talking, arguing...)?
More politically, how are we to realize our wishes to be free, if
not through legal constraint? While we may succeed in building
fences and in establishing parks, the desire for a law of wilderness is a contradiction of itself, as is the desire for an orderly
chaos or a known unknown.
The tragedy of public law is particularly biting for lawyers,
who revere the Rule of Law after they have lost faith in all else.
Even lawyers, otherwise cynical, dream of the redemptive possibilities of a future law, that is, hope to be progressive. But here,
vis-a-vis their own undeniable longings for the primitive, for the
absence rather than the Rule of Law, lawyers are forced to confront essential limitations of their ideals. As lawyers, even our
gods are finite.
AND
IV. KAFKA'S LAUGHTER: MARKETS, ALIENATION,
60
THE POSSIBILITY OF AFFECTION
I am slightly embarrassed to admit that I do not take globalization seriously: I find myself snickering while cheerleaders
and doomsayers shout it out. Instead of something more earnest, my response to supranational capitalism is a sense of
alienation, far too often expressed as wry laughter. Such laughter is apt to cause social difficulties: Serious people intuit a politically incorrect stance on the part of the laugher, me. In re60. This was originally presented at the World Association of International
Studies (WAIS) Conference, Globalizations:Reflections on the State of the World and
Its Discontents, Stanford University (July 31, 2001), available at www.law.buffalo.
edu/dwestbro/kafkalaughter.htm.
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sponse to my unfashion, I have taken some intellectual comfort
in Kafka, who also believed that laughter was the best medicine
for alienation. I even think that Kafka, if he were alive today,
would join me in arguing that an ironic view of supranational
capitalism is both reasonable and comforting.
The place where I laugh at money most often is The Wall
Street Journal. If you also read The Journal regularly, I am
sure you will agree that it publishes some of the funniest writing in U.S. public life. For example, discussing Dubya's cabinet,
specifically Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, then Treasury
Secretary Paul O'Neill, and Secretary of State Colin Powell, The
Journalhad this to say:
All three cabinet chiefs have mastered the earnest diction of business
self-help. "The way to do well is to do well," Mr. Rumsfeld counsels.
"Were you treated with dignity and respect today?" asks Mr. 6O'Neill.
1
Powell.
"Perpetual optimism is a force multiplier," declares Mr.

To be clear; the Secretary of Defense, Secretary of the Treasury,
and Secretary of State of the United States, the three bureaucrats perhaps most responsible for projecting U.S. power worldwide, really would prefer to write for in-flight magazines.
Or take the woman whose recovery from life-threatening
breast cancer inspired her to plunge back into her deeply meaningful work as, you guessed it, a marketing executive. 62 Of
course, not just any marketing executive, but one for an international pharmaceutical company.6 3 Once back in the fray, our
heroine calls for a new line of advertisements, exhorting women
to think of themselves as warriors, to view their diseases as battles, and not incidentally, to buy drugs.64 In this and countless
other articles, The Journal gives us a sustained ironic voice, a
catty take on money and the world as its playground. Through
its reporting on market activity, The Journal provides a jaundiced view of what our now global society is coming to.
A recent favorite of mine was entitled Prison as Profit Center. 65 The good folks in the State of Oregon decided that prisoners ought to stop wasting tax dollars, and they should start

61. Carla Anne Robbins, Rules-Happy Cabinet:Rumsfeld, Powell and O'Neill
Weigh In, WALL ST. J., Mar. 2, 2001, at Al.
62. Emily Nelson, Battle Cry: How Women Warriors Replaced Gardeners in
P&GAd Campaign,WALL ST. J., Feb. 21, 2001, at Al.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Joseph T. Hallinan, Prison as Profit Center, WALL ST. J., Mar. 15, 2001, at
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earning their keep.66 Instead of being a liability, prisons should
become an asset. So The Journalreported that the Oregon prisons were doing business as "Inside Oregon Enterprises." 7 What
is the business of Inside Oregon, you ask? Well, what do prisons
have? That's right, prisoners. Human capital. The State of
Oregon is in the business of renting people out. As The Journal
put it, "a convict version of Kelly Girls."65 Such dry humor (as if
secretarial services were the obvious reason to rent people) almost distracts one from the elegance of the enterprises' cost
structure, namely, the 13th Amendment's prohibition on involuntary servitude does not apply to those incarcerated by due legal process. And in this regard, it bears mentioning that - perhaps in deference to a certain historically rooted squeamishness
- no persons of color appeared in the photographs accompanying
"Prisons as Profit Center." Good politics and low cost - good
business - what more could one want from a justice system?
The Journal's barrage of satire is more than just an accident of brilliant journalism.6 9 Money breeds laughter - not always nice laughter, not necessarily we're-laughing-with-you
laughter, but laughter nonetheless - and so we should expect to
find The Journal funny. More generally, we should approach
capitalism with a sense of humor. Admittedly, capitalism is
rarely viewed as a laughing matter. Economics has long been
called the "dismal science" for a reason.7 ° Moreover, the general
attitude of most academics - apart from economists - towards

capitalism is fairly distrustful, to say the least. And every time
one of the Bretton Woods Institutions holds one of its meetings
to plan world history, gangs of people show up to protest globalization. Such people believe that capitalism, especially global
capitalism, is serious business indeed and not funny at all.
They are wrong. Global capitalism is hilarious.
As at least most of its critics would argue, global capitalism
is, to use an old fashioned word, alienating. Just because globalization is alienating, however, does not mean it cannot be
funny. Instead, just the opposite. Globalization is funny for the
same reasons it is alienating, and The Journal is funny because
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Perhaps those of us who care about U.S. letters will come to regard the
Wall Street Journal at century's end as we did PartisanReview at mid-century.
70. Since Thomas Carlyle read Thomas Robert Malthus. See generally ROBERT
HEILBRONER, THE WORLDLY PHILOSOPHERS (Simon & Schuster Inc. 7th ed. 1999)
(1953).
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it is a chronicle, or better yet, a daily anatomy, of our alienation.
But what does it mean to say that alienation is funny? Can
we even specify what we mean by saying that the creation of a
global polity based on trade, and especially the trade in tokens
of value, finance, is alienating? What is alienation? As this essay's title suggests, a traditional and therefore obvious place to
start with these questions is Franz Kafka. 7' Not that Kafka confronts our problem directly. As fiction generally should, Kafka
shows rather than tells. Kafka's work tends to place the reader
in a bizarre, and yet disturbingly familiar, exile. Reading
Kafka, we recognize the place, and the old anxieties return, even
though we have never been here before and have no clear idea
why we feel threatened. This strange familiarity, the way in
which Kafka's text still speaks, allows us to believe that Kafka
is addressing an alienation somehow akin to our own. But how?
What is the specific source of the discomfort we have in reading
Kafka?
Once upon a time there was a Marxian canard that Kafka's
work was a cry of bourgeois despair, that Kafka was writing
about the alienation caused by life in markets.72 This is too
easy. Kafka himself, and many of his characters, are hardly
shining examples of Homo economicus. More importantly, nothing about central aspects of Kafka's work - his mythical China,7 3
his even more famous allegories of the law,74 or even his discovery of himself as a dung beetle75 - seems to require a marketplace economy. Kafka's own milieu, a tottering empire, certainly had markets, but Prague remained in many respects a
traditional society, organized along lines other than those required by markets, not yet entirely of the modern world that the
Great War would usher in. Indeed, Kafka's understanding of
alienation is sufficiently independent of markets to have made
his writing critically pertinent to life under communism. And
yet there must be some truth to the canard about Kafka's work
as a critique of capitalism, if only because Kafka reads so well in
71. For a sampling of Kafka's work, see FRANz KAFKA, THE METAMORPHOSIS
AND OTHER STORIES (Barnes & Noble Books 1996).
72. See, e.g., Walter H. Sokel, From Marx to Myth: The Structure and Function
of Self-Alienation in Kafka's Metamorphosis,26 LITERARY REVIEW 485 (1983); Robin
West, Authority, Autonomy and Choice: The Role of Consent in the Moral and Political Visions of Franz Kafka and Richard Posner, 99 HARV. L. REV. 384, 386-87
(1985).
73. KAFKA, supra note 71.
74. Id.
75. Id.
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the context of our discontent with today's global market society.
We can speak of much of today's world as "Kafkaesque," and
mean no compliment thereby. But what explains Kafka's current relevance? Why does Kafka, writing at the end of the
Austro-Hungarian Empire, nonetheless seem so contemporary?
Kafka was trained as a lawyer and images of the law pervade his work. In the law, as in Kafka, formality is substituted
for reality. The law concerns itself with legal roles, i.e., people
formally defined as social and political functions, rather than
with individuals themselves. One's name is accidental to becoming plaintiff or defendant, buyer or seller, employer or employee, lender or debtor. (Very few of Kafka's protagonists have
full names; their own identities are largely dispensable.) Similarly, the law does not contemplate things themselves, but
rights to things - entitlements - not the tissue and substance of

what we eat, drink, control, but legally defined rights to exclude,
alienate, devise, and: To take the facts of a situation and make
a case out of it. Law replaces life's particulars with society's
general and authoritative categories.
As the expression of authority, the law could judge a person's life, and thereby relieve the wretch of his terrible uncertainty as to whether he has lived well, or more generally,
whether his life has meant anything at all. Kafka's characters
are supplicants before the law. Although they may fear the
moment, they desire judgment. The yearning for law reflects
the human desire to locate our individuality within a broader
framework of meaning. But in Kafka, the law withholds judgment. The law does not actually recognize the man, does not
tell him what he means, thereby giving him status in the
community. The law waits, or at most, recognizes the man's
social role - petitioner, messenger, accused, clerk, and even son
- always somebody whose existence is derived from others, from
a function. The wretch never musters the courage to force the
law to acknowledge him for what he is, and so he dies begging or
waiting for recognition. The wretch dies as a set of claims,
rather less than successful, without ever having been recognized
- and so having lived - as a man who meant something in and

to his community. The wretch dies a foreigner in his own land,
alienated and nameless.
One must ask whether Kafka's discontent with the law's
formality is reasonable. Could the law, as distinguished from
the love of a father and certain versions of God, do otherwise?
The law, as we have seen, turns on formality, on entitlements.
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The law has no equipment with which to deal with people as
such; it can only see plaintiffs and defendants, buyers and sellers, and the like. Law that operated with something other than
legal categories would not be law. But legal formality is not reality, and so, to turn to the law for legitimization, as Kafka's
characters do, is simultaneously to abandon the possibility of being recognized for oneself. Kafka's characters are thus caught
in a terrible double bind: On their own, they have no assurance
of their worth, but if they turn to social authority, law, in an attempt to legitimate themselves, they find that they can do no
more than make formal, empty, claims. Law is thus both irresistibly attractive and necessarily unsatisfying.
As Walter Benjamin put it, paraphrasing Berthold Brecht,
Kafka "had only one problem, that of organization. What seized
him was fear of the ant-colony state: how people become estranged from themselves by the forms of their communal life." 76
The translation of the human situation - the man or woman in
community - into our legal functionalities is the mechanism of
our alienation. In a market society like our own, the forms of
communal life that estrange us from ourselves are the property
entitlements and the embodiments of value called money that
together comprise the price mechanism. This is not to say that
markets are the only mechanisms of alienation, other forms of
communal life will do nicely. One might also be alienated by the
forms of social life in early 20th century Prague, or by the offices
of the Communist Party. But for us, who live in a world so
largely constructed by markets, it is markets that alienate. To
repeat the thought; Kafka reads well today and we are alienated
because capitalism requires us to understand life in terms of
prices. At a deeper level, we understand our situation within a
market in terms of the interrelationships between those claims
we understand to be money and those claims we understand to
be property. Our true selves, however, cannot be recognized behind our entitlements. In short, the hoary arguments about the
dehumanization of life in the marketplace are fundamentally
correct.
So, taking the criticism of globalization very seriously indeed, the question is, what do we do? On good days, we laugh.
How can we laugh? Well, laughter comes naturally, or does not,
but if we find ourselves in fact laughing when we read The Jour76. WALTER BENJAMIN,
REFLECTIONS:
ESSAYS,
APHORISMS,
AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL WRITINGS 205 (Peter Demetz ed., Edmund Jephcott trans., Harcourt

Brace Jovanovich 1978).
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Journal,we can reflect on what our laughter might mean. One
way• to think
about
humor is as the unexpected juxtaposition of
• •
77
incongruities.
That is, we laugh at seeing combinations of
things that do not belong together, and that might therefore be
thought of as ridiculous or absurd. With this idea of humor in
mind, if we turn our attention to markets, we see something
quite marvelous. Markets, in which we sell what we have in order to buy what we do not, operate to bring things that are fundamentally unlike one another into conjunction with one another. Money makes properties commensurable. Money and
property, the very formalizations that are the mechanisms of
our alienation, juxtapose things that are entirely different from
one another. Markets therefore tend to create humorous situations, the juxtaposition of unlikes. And this is why The Journal
is so often funny, and life in capitalism is deeply absurd. Returning to our earlier examples, we have seen, in this monetary
society over the last few months; the spectacle of real political
power spoken in the grammar of business self-help, the existential horror of breast cancer inspiring the petty banality of advertising; and a slight confusion between punishment and profit,
with the frisson of chattel slavery. 5
Such things are humorous in fundamentally the same way.
We know the truth is other than what the markets suggest.
Shortly after we learned that Rumsfeld and Powell thought of
themselves in language we associate with slightly sweaty businessmen in airports, hoping to read the paperback that will
make it all come together, Rumsfeld and Powell coordinated the
overthrow of Afghanistan's government. We are quite sure that
breast cancer is not about shopping, and we have our suspicions
about prison, whatever we might say in a polite marketplace.
Our confrontation with the markets - our realization that the
truth is not what appears on the economic stage - is ironic in
character.
Like The Journal, Kafka understood that the same processes of formality that we are likely to find alienating may also
be the occasion for ironic laughter. The formality that is so central to the sense of dread, even horror, that Kafka evokes also

77. Diligent search has not turned up a citation for the not unfamiliar quotation.
Generally speaking, incongruity theories are associated with Kant and
Schopenhauer and have become the dominant philosophical mode of thinking about
humor. See generally THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAUGHTER AND HUMOR (John Morreall
ed., 1987).
78. See supra notes 61-68 and accompanying text.
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makes his stories very funny. As Kafka's friend and biographer
Max Brod recalled:
When Kafka read aloud himself, this humor became particularly clear.
Thus, for example, we friends of his laughed quite immoderately when
he first let us hear the first chapter of The Trial. And he himself
laughed so much that there were moments when he couldn't read any
further. 7Astonishing enough, when you think of the fearful earnestness...

Formality - in our society money and property - simultaneously

alienates us and affords us humorous juxtapositions. Money is
alienating, as we long suspected, but in creating the floating
world of financial relations, money presents endless opportunities for jokes.
There is something more than a little unsettling about this,
about realizing that existential horror and modern humor are so
compatible. Discussing Kafka's laughter, Brod concedes that
laughing at The Trial is "not entirely good, comfortable laughter."" The book, after all, is not merely a comedy of middle
European manners, in which social forms are juxtaposed in
amusing and surprising ways. The Trial is also about wretchedness, torture, and quasi-judicial killing, topics that might
seem to have the same humorous potential as our earlier examples of power politics, breast cancer, and prison slavery. It
might seem that the only laughter that we could imagine in
such circumstances would be cold, probably cruel. Brod does not
deny this outright - much of laughter is an assertion of
strength, as Aristotle insisted,8 and in laughing at wretchedness, Kafka reminds his readers of their complicity.
But cruelty is far from the whole story. Brod also insists
that "the ingredients of a good laugh were also there."8 2 What is
meant by "a good laugh"? Brod tells us that what is "easily forgotten in studies of Kafka" is "the streak of joy in the world and
in life."83 The juxtaposition of incongruities is not enough; not
even joy at our relative strength is enough. Kafka's laughter at
The Trial, and our laughter at the exuberances of capitalism,
depends on taking joy in the world. Thomas Mann explained:
"But when you consider that laughter of such a sort, with such

79. MAx BROD, FRANZ KAFKA: A BIOGRAPHY 178 (G. Humphreys Roberts
trans., Schocken Books 2d ed. 1960) (1937).

80.
81.
82.
83.

Id.
See THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAUGHTER AND HUMOR, supra note 77.
Brod, supra note 79.
Id.
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deep and lofty sources, is probably the best thing that remains
to us, then you will be inclined, with me, to place Kafka's warmhearted fantasies among the best worth reading in the world's
treasury of literature." 84 And so our ability to laugh, even the
cold and ironic laughter with which we may greet The Journal's
account of the absurdities that global capital markets will regularly produce, depends on our ability to love.
Speaking of love suggests a grander and more charitable
way of thinking about laughter, drawing on the idea that comedy is the erotic counterpart to tragedy, and it is in this vein
that I will close. Recall young Nicholas Leeson, the "rogue
trader" who, by placing leveraged bets on the movement of the
Nikei, caused the collapse of Barings Bank, the bank that had
financed among other things the Louisiana Purchase." There
was a brief period, after the damage was done, when young
Nicky and his pretty wife were on the run across the tropical
Pacific. 6 Now I want you to be honest with yourself- didn't you
hope they would get away? I know I did. The bank was finished, there was nothing to be done - Nick had taken the big
chance and was on the lam. He had succumbed to terrible
temptation (made worse by the bank's lack of internal risk
management), eaten at the apple and saw, by God, that he was
naked, and so was she.., and their very nakedness had certain
possibilities.
Although money is alienating, as we long suspected, in creating the false world of financial relations, money creates endless opportunities for jokes. But money is not only alienating
and therefore funny. Money is also an embodiment of permission, an invitation to take liberties, and so a temptation. It is
precisely by taking liberties, by succumbing to temptation, that
the human comedy proceeds, and that we gain the strength to
laugh at our lies.
Conclusion
In going about its task, each of these three essays has taken
an attitude that might be appropriate for a custodian of our
formalities (for a lawyer in a self-consciously global society) to
take towards the law that now rules.
The first attitude is necessity. Our understanding of what
84. Thomas Mann, Homage xvii (1940), Foreward to FRANZ KAFKA, THE
CASTLE (Shocken Books 2nd ed. 1974).
85. See generally NICK LEESON ET AL., ROGUE TRADER: How I BROUGHT DOWN
BARINGS BANK AND SHOOK THE FINANCIAL WORLD (1996).

86.

Id.
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the social order might require (our idea of justice) is already
global. We understand war, and more importantly still, the
making of peace (nation building), in terms defined by the global
polity, indeed, as the extension of global civilization. Second, we
need not be content with our admission of complicity and constraint in the global order. While we may revel in the material
goods brought to us by the markets, we may look to law as the
limitation of such desires. Law, then, becomes the field on
which we ceaselessly fail to resolve our contradictions. Third,
and stepping back yet farther, there is something deeply human
about such efforts. The fact that we do not love our politics does
not mean we do not love the people among whom we live, and do
not intuit how hope, including love, may drive more than theory.
Taken together, these essays suggest that our reverence for
the Rule of Law, simply understood, is gone, but also that we
may still have - should still have - an erotic fondness for our
human, especially because all too human, efforts to ameliorate
our condition. The contemporary lawyer should be able to temper mockery with affection, or even grant a chuckling respect,
for the artifacts of our markets and the bureaucracies that
struggle to save them - for the human efforts to think our lives
together and to achieve a modicum of happiness among our limitations and fears. And in the absence of alternatives, is it surprising that we are willing to back up such mocking respect with
the fantasies, and at least some of the weapons, of our day?
Cultural imperialism, indeed.
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